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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a case study of the investment banking arm of a multinational banking 
corporation (Invebank) which is attempting to introduce Component-Based Development (CBD). 
Problems were apparent in this adoption because, while CBD requires extensive knowledge sharing 
and collaboration, sub-cultural differences between groups within Invebank meant that this proved 
difficult to enact. Thus, the paper considers the complexities of sub-cultural differences in firms and 
provides a salutary reminder that the implementation of so-called corporate-wide integrative 
‘solutions’ such as Business Process Reengineering (BPR) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
systems, as well as CBD, cannot, automatically, bear fruit in terms of firm performance. Further, the 
paper highlights the point that there is more to the issue of organizational sub-cultural differences 
than the oft-cited business-IT divide. The more simplistic entreaties to knowledge sharing and the 
nurture of collaborative cultures and consensus are also brought into question. 
Key words: Organizational culture; organizational sub-cultures; component-based development; 
knowledge sharing; interpretive research; case study research. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Attempting to achieve organizational renewal through IT innovation is increasingly popular. This is 
evidenced, for example, by the large number of organizations, which have undertaken Business 
Process Reengineering (BPR) (Hammer and Champy, 1993), and more recently, the growing number 
that have adopted corporate-wide integrative solutions, such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
systems (CACM, 2000) and Component-Based Development (CBD) (Grundy et al., 2000). All such 
initiatives are based on the premise that they will drive strategically important organizational change. 
We argue that such initiatives should not simply be seen as IT innovations, which can be dealt with in 
isolation. Rather, there is a need to develop an organizational context where a synergy can be created 
through the integration of IT strategizing within the organization (Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997).
ECIS 2002 • June 6–8, Gdańsk, Poland — First — Previous — Next — Last — Contents —
Jimmy C. Huang, Sue Newell, Robert D. Galliers 
220
In terms of this organizational context, some researchers conceptualizes it as organizational climate 
(e.g., Schneider et al., 1996), while others prefer the label organizational culture (e.g., Harrington and 
Ruppel, 1999). In this paper we use the term organizational culture. Organizational culture has been 
shown to influence the process of how new technology is adopted, embedded and institutionalized 
within the hosting organization. For instance, Davenport (1994) and Powell and Dent-Micallef (1997) 
both depict the need for an information culture that is open, flexible and expansive in order to leverage 
the implementation of new technology. Similarly, Ruppel and Harrington (2001) and El Sawy et al.
(2001), argue for the need to develop a culture that encourages the development of trust and 
knowledge sharing.
However, in the literature on organizational culture, many now highlight the importance of sub-
cultural differences, and downplay the existence of a single, unifying organizational culture. These 
authors highlight the reasons for differentiating between sub-culture and culture. For example, 
Blackler (1995) and Sackmann (1992) both suggest that sub-cultural differences exist because of 
differences between tasks, expertise and activities performed by various organizational groups. Given 
these differences, they argue, an organizational culture cannot simply be perceived as an aggregation 
of various sub-cultures. There is nothing common, necessarily, between these sub-cultures that can be 
said to be universally applicable to the entire organization. Tajfel and Turner (1985) suggest that sub-
culture represents a distinctive set of shared values, mindsets and norms that reflects a group’s social 
identity. As Schein (1996) indicates, this divides an organization into various informal groups with 
invisible boundaries. De Long and Fahey (2000) explore sub-culture differences as an outcome of 
paradigmatic diversity between organizational members. This, they argue, often leads to the creation 
of barriers that inhibit cross-functional collaboration and the implementation of corporate-wide 
initiatives. These accounts, then, not only highlight the distinctive characteristics and significance of 
sub-culture, but also suggest the need to take into account the dynamics of sub-cultural differences 
when exploring the process of IT adoption within an organizational context Yet, our understanding of 
how organizational sub-culture inter-plays with the process of technology development remains very 
limited, with few studies specifically addressing this issue (Hauser, 1998). 
The objective of this paper, then, is to explore how sub-cultural differences within an organization 
influence the adoption of IT. The particular IT here is Component-Based Development (CBD), as 
adopted in a case company - Invebank. CBD has been presented as a revolutionary approach capable 
of breaking down the traditional technology-engineering life cycle to speed up the process of 
technology development, in particular in software engineering. Instead of developing a new 
technology following the conventional end-to-end path, the CBD approach reuses and assembles 
existing components to create a new system within an “evolvable environment” (alternatively called 
component-based architecture), where new solutions can be effectively added on (Grundy et al.,
2000). However, CBD is not a panacea to cure all IT development problems. For instance, Bosch 
(1999) reports that reusable components often require substantial modification to meet system 
requirements, in particular when business objectives differ from the objective for which those 
components were originally developed. More importantly, from the point of view of this paper, Kunda 
and Brooks (2000) argue that the human and social issues related to the introduction of CBD are 
typically overlooked as a result of an overemphasis on the technological benefits of CBD. Their study 
suggests that the introduction of CBD is a socio-technical challenge where group and organizational 
dynamics and technological advancement continuously and mutually shape and reshape each other. 
Despite the fact that Kunda and Brooks’ study has surfaced the importance of social considerations 
and has briefly addressed the influence of organizational culture on the introduction of CBD, however, 
the significance of sub-cultural differences remains undeveloped, both in relation to this specific 
technology and more generally. This paper aims to rectify this state of affairs and is structured as 
follows. We first turn to epistemological issues associated with this case study by describing the 
research methodology followed. Next, we highlight the major findings before drawing conclusions 
from the case in relation to extant theory. 
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2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Guided by the focus of examining the influence of subcultural differences on CBD implementation, 
the research described in this paper adopts an interpretive approach. The strengths of the interpretive 
paradigm in IS research have been reported in a number of studies, notably Klein and Myers (1999) 
and Walsham (1993). The appropriateness of adopting an interpretive approach is reflected in the need 
for investigating the implemented technology, in this case CBD, and taking into account the broader 
organizational context, in various particular subcultures. For example, in the words of Walsham (1993; 
4-5), interpretive research methods are “aimed at producing an understanding of the context of the 
information system, and the process whereby the information system influences and is influenced by 
the context”. Further explanation provided by Klein and Myers (1999; 69) states that interpretive 
research “attempts to understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them”.  
The data collection process was undertaken during the period April 1999 to March 2001. The research 
started with two months of on-site observation enabling familiarization with the social setting and 
fostering a better understanding of the background of the case company, including its structure, sub-
cultures and business processes. This initial investigation helped make sense of the intertwined 
dynamics of organizational sub-cultures and CBD. Following this initial phase, sixteen semi-
structured interviews were conducted during the first six months of study, followed by a second round, 
during which eleven staff members were interviewed. This took place in the period February to 
August 2000, with a third round of eight interviews during September 2000 and March 2001. Each 
lasted 90 minutes on average. In conjunction with these semi-structured interviews, informal 
interviews via telephone and email were conducted in order to reach interviewees who were 
geographically dispersed. All interviews, including those via telephone, were tape recorded and 
transcribed. Each interview transcription was shown to the interviewees to ensure validity, and used as 
a reference point for additional telephone and email discussion. Additional data were collected from 
company documentation, including letters, written reports, administrative documents, newspapers and 
company archives. Further information was also gleaned from the company Intranet site.  
Data collected from the various sources were analyzed based on the coding techniques proposed by 
Miles and Huberman (1994) and Strauss and Corbin (1990). Despite the fact that the purpose of this 
research was not geared towards theory generation, the open coding technique proposed by Strauss 
and Corbin was found to be useful, in particular to generate categories and concepts that were further 
used to compare with the current literature. Various conceptually clustered matrices (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) were developed to display evidence based on the key themes, according to the four 
sources of evidence. Also, this technique was employed to generate conceptual similarities and 
differences between the research themes.  
3. CASE FINDINGS 
3.1. Case Background 
Restructured in 1997, Invebank, the investment banking arm of a multinational banking corporation, 
provides a range of financial products, including foreign exchange, currency options and interest rate 
derivatives. Operating in major financial centers, including London, New York, Tokyo and Hong 
Kong, a total of 1,500 employees generated more than $2 billion gross profits in 2000, an increase of 
6% compared to 1999. A large number of new staff with various skills, accounting for more than 40% 
of the total workforce, were recruited after 1997, mainly on a contractual basis (33% of total 
employees), to fulfill growing demand.  
The procedure by which each transaction is made provides a means of understanding how Invebank 
operates. Three business functions are accountable for different stages of the transaction, namely front, 
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back and middle offices. The front office is in charge of buying and selling financial products for 
clients, the back office settles the payment and the middle office is responsible for tracing and 
checking the match between trading and settlement. Each office has two main groups - business and 
technology - and each group is divided into various teams based on the specific range of products in 
which they specialize. Thus, in addition to the central supporting functions (such as Human Resources, 
Accounting, and Research), members of Invebank staff are organized as a matrix.  
The investment banking sector exists within an increasingly turbulent environment. Many firms, 
including Invebank, have responded to this environment by attempting to become increasingly 
innovative. Indeed, ‘continuous innovation’ was seen by senior management as a key requirement, in 
terms of both product and technological innovation. The product innovation emphasis was on the 
combination and modification of existing products. In terms of technological innovation, there was a 
perceived need for the continuous advancement of technology as a means of supporting and managing 
the trading and settlement processes. Managers recognized that innovation across these two areas also 
needed to be aligned since new financial products could not be traded unless supporting technologies 
were in place. In particular, the growing popularity of combining Internet-based trading with 
conventional modes of trading (e.g., telephone) requires an integrative backbone system that can 
effectively facilitate different modes of trading and handle various sources of trading traffic 
simultaneously. The interdependence of product and technology suggests that the firm’s overall 
innovation capability can only derive from the simultaneous development of both the business and 
technology functions.  
3.2 The Adoption of CBD: Motivation, Needs and Advantages 
Various initiatives were introduced in Invebank during the 1997 restructuring. CBD was the key 
initiative in relation to technological development. CBD was presented as a means by which Invebank 
would gain technological leadership within its sector. Specifically, the goals were: (i) to build a 
flexible IT infrastructure, (ii) to shorten development time, and (iii) to reduce the cost of technology 
development by reusing existing components. The following quote from a senior manager epitomizes 
the rationale for introducing CBD as a means of improving the efficiency of technological 
development: “Because the industry is moving so fast you need to be light on your feet and ready to 
implement new parts quickly … you need to put a technical infrastructure in place such that you can 
implement new things correctly. And we have developed such an interface such a technical structure 
over the last year or so (with CBD). That allows us to do things quite quickly.”
In addition to the above advantages, CBD was also promoted as a technology development approach, 
which would enable the engagement of end-users in the development process. As one of the 
technologists explained:  “It gives you the binding of the users since they’re actually involved in the 
development of the program. It’s a bit like prototyping. You can ask the users how they like it and you 
can quickly move components around from there to there, or change screen colors and so on.” This 
aspect of CBD was seen to be particularly important within Invebank because it allowed them, 
potentially at least, to effectively manage technological development even in business areas where the 
user base is small and geographically dispersed. As one of the directors noted: “We have an 
architecture whereby we can provide say a functionality to a program but only one user in the world 
can see that. We have the capability to give them sole access to play around with it and see how they 
like it…. We can therefore make new functionality available to New York or Hong Kong, even if we’re 
not here.”
These advantages of CBD were used as the justification for adopting the approach, even though the 
initial costs of setting up the component-based infrastructure and of developing reusable components 
was higher than would have been the cost of upgrading and modifying existing systems. For instance, 
an internal report in 1999 stated that capital investment required for CBD had exceeded 1998’s annual 
technology development budget by 240%. However, this was seen to be a short-term problem since 
senior directors expected that the running costs would be drastically reduced once the inventory of 
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reusable components gradually increased. In reality, however, the anticipated advantages and 
efficiencies to be gained from the adoption of CBD were not all achieved. During a lunch break with a 
front office business director in early 2000, he expressed the view that Invebank was “continuing to 
throw money into a big black hole”. He continued by saying that Invebank could only benefit from its 
investment when a critical mass of the inventory of reusable components had been developed and it 
was not clear when this might happen. This paper provides some explanation as to why Invebank 
failed to leverage the full potential of CBD.
3.3 Difficulties in Leveraging the Potential of CBD 
Interviewees suggested that a key difficulty had been simply managing the transformation involved in 
changing from the existing technology architecture and operating systems to a component-based 
interface. The technological and operational difficulties of this change were summarized by one of the 
managers by using a driving metaphor. He explained that it was like driving a car very fast on the 
motorway on a rainy day, while at the same time you are trying to change the fuel from gasoline to 
electricity. Notwithstanding, even though the operational and technological difficulties appeared to be 
substantial, interviewees commonly indicated that the main impediments related to human issues, as 
considered below. 
Firstly, considerable end-user and technologist resistance to CBD was experienced. One reason for the 
end-user resistance was that they had been provided with very little training: “One of the main 
obstacles is that our user bases are nowhere near as computer literate as they should be. So that’s a 
fundamental issue with this organization. It will get better, but where’s the training budget? People 
come to me and expect me to train them about the systems that we’ve got. I could do that, but do you 
want me doing that or do you want me building technology solutions? (Global Head of Technology). 
Technologists appeared to be resisting the introduction of CBD because they perceived it as a threat. 
They believed that once the critical mass of CBD inventory of reusable components has been 
developed the requirement for expert technologist would be reduced.
Secondly, interviewees highlighted the problem of a lack of collaboration. The essence of CBD is that 
components are reusable, but this reusability could only be achieved in Invebank if information about 
these components was shared across the entire Technology Division, including teams in the front, 
middle and back offices. Moreover, the growing number of cross-category products demanded cross-
category solutions to support trading. For instance, a new product with the attributes of interest rate 
derivatives and foreign exchange (two separate product categories) would require technologists 
working in the two product categories to form a joint team to develop a solution which could support 
both the trading and settlement processes. However, in the past each group of technologists had 
worked on technologies to support a single product category. As the General Manager explained:  “We
have a large number of groups which do not want to share information, and do not want to build 
systems in a way that is component-based, because they believe that their value is so rich because of 
the environment that they have got. And they see things that run across products as a threat to their 
position and their stance.” Similarly, one of the front office technology managers recalled: “I mean, 
interaction between developments is minimal. It’s on a need to know, requirement basis, so if there are 
requirements from other systems on our systems then we get involved. Why? Because I guess we’re 
such a small team we just don’t have the time, actual leisure time to sit and converse ideas with other 
teams. We don’t have that luxury.”
Information sharing and collaboration was thus problematic and uncommon within Invebank. This 
was partly due to the reality of organizational silos that were themselves stimulated by the product-
based matrix structure. A number of the interviewees described the difficulties of collaboration, 
providing a number of explanations for this. For example, one of the technologists suggested that 
internal politics was the central issue: “I guess it is all about politics in the bank. You’ve got to go 
through a lot of hoops to get anything done, a lot of sign-offs, a lot of bureaucracy …. For us to 
actually be at the forefront of technology, at the cutting edge, we have to constantly break those 
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politics.” One of the senior front office directors saw it as a manifestation of the ongoing conflict 
between the front and back office personnel: “I have been in a job two months and I thought there 
might be loads of people in the back office who might be affected by what I was going to do. I phoned 
the guy who is the head of technology down there. He got all his people around a table and I brought 
in my presentation and my two project managers. We turned up, they turned up fifteen minutes late. 
Then, they said we had ten minutes before they had to go to another meeting. So I started talking and 
they argued with me about some of the things I said - the argument lasted nine minutes, they left and 
that was it. So I thought that was it. I went all the way down to the back office to communicate with 
them and they give me ten minutes of their time. So I don’t bother now ... I am not sure they want to be 
communicated to really.”
3.4 Organizational Culture and Sub-culture  
To focus more specifically on these problems of resistance and lack of collaboration, in this section we 
consider these problems in relation to organizational culture and sub-culture, given the significance of 
a collaborative culture that has been stressed in the literature reviewed earlier. Indeed, within 
Invebank, managers emphasized the importance of cultivating such a collaborative culture to ensure 
the success of CBD. For example, the General Manager stated: “At the moment, we are trying to 
address this precise issue (of culture), because it’s like having a Concorde running on one engine. The 
reason to develop a collaborative culture isn’t just around people who will enjoy coming to work, but 
also to educate our people about the value of sharing knowledge with others. If you share information, 
the culture will move twice the pace it’s moving today. If you break down those barriers where 
everybody thinks they’re right, you’ll move three times as fast.”
Despite this awareness that they lacked a collaborative culture, there was little evidence that this was 
changing. Indeed, there was no consensus about what the organizational culture was. Some 
interviewees suggested that an Invebank culture did not exist: “I don’t think we have got one”, “it does 
not exist”, and “it is not yet formed”. Other interviewees, all from the front office, described it as a 
“fast moving culture”. Others  indicated that Invebank had an “unforgiving culture”. As one manager 
indicated: “whatever you did in the past is forgotten, but if you make a mistake today, you’re out.”
There was considerable consensus amongst interviewees, however, about “cultural” differences 
between different functions and groups. Here then, we use the term “sub-culture” to indicate a set of 
norms, beliefs, values and practices shared by a group of organizational members that is distinctive 
from the norms, beliefs, values and practices of other groups within the organization. In the following 
discussion, we outline what appeared to be the main sub-cultural differences identified in Invebank 
and the impact of sub-cultural differences on the development of CBD.  
The main sub-cultural differences appeared to be derived from the fact that different tasks were 
performed by different groups. In particular, the difference in tasks performed by individuals within 
the front and back office were marked. These differences were not only reflected in their different 
business objectives, but also the different mind-sets evident in each office. For instance, the front 
office, where all trading takes place, relies heavily on traders’ expertise, efficiency and willingness to 
take risks. Conversely, accuracy appeared to be the major concern of the back office to ensure that 
payments are settled correctly to avoid any penalty. There was also a difference in the type of person 
in these two offices, with traders in the front office tending to be much younger than those in the back 
office. The gulf between these two groups is illustrated in the quote below from a front office 
manager, when describing those in the back office: “Some pockets are very old-fashioned like in the 
1960s - dinosaurs - unresponsive to change and always done it this way (sic.). ‘I have been in this job 
twenty-five years and will retire in five years. Why do I want to change?’ ‘This computer will never 
work.’ ‘Plod on with pen and paper’ - all that sort of stuff. These individuals themselves I don’t have 
an issue with because they have always been like that. It is hard to teach an old dog new tricks. It’s 
true. These guys have never seen a PC and never used a PC and we are coming along with a trading 
system and you’ve got to teach them how to use the PC first. You deal with them differently than you 
ECIS 2002 • June 6–8, Gdańsk, Poland — First — Previous — Next — Last — Contents —
The Impact of Organizational Sub-cultures on the Implementation of Component-based Development… 
225
would deal with a derivatives trader who’s 27 and been using a PC since he was eight. There’s a 
different way of doing it.”
There was also a clear sub-cultural divide between those in the business function and those in 
technology. As one senior manager indicated, sub-cultural differences between members of staff in 
technology and business had created an obstacle in forming a shared view about the value of CBD and 
the need for continuous investment, vital for optimizing CBD capacity: “People in the business 
environment tend to think that technology is ‘toys for boys’ and they just want to play. It’s hard for us 
technologists to educate them and communicate with them, so that they can understand the value of 
CBD and understand what we’ve done well and that we need more money to do even better.”
This difference between the business and technology functions was exacerbated by the fact that many 
of those in the technology department were contractors while most of those in the business function 
were permanent staff. The extent of this difference is illustrated by the fact that some permanent staff 
did not consider contractors as part of Invebank, and argued that they should not receive additional 
benefits from the firm. In the words of the Global Head of Human Resources, contractors are 
“mercenary”, therefore it was Invebank’s policy not to provide any training to the contractors, simply 
because it was their responsibility to ensure their own market value. As one of the managers argued: 
“they take the money, they take the chance”. On the other hand, contractors argued that they brought in 
valuable expertise to Invebank, and did not feel that they received fair treatment in return. One 
contractor was interviewed three months after leaving the bank and complained that often his line 
manager had had unreasonable expectations of him. As he explained, even though some systems were 
developed in-house, it was very difficult to obtain adequate information and training about them. He 
also indicated that, during his 18 month contract, it had been very unpleasant to be involved in the 
CBD initiative, particularly due to poor relationships with permanent staff.  
Sub-cultural differences between individuals working for different product categories were also 
evident, particularly in the front office. In informal conversations with the front office interviewees, it 
was explained that each individual’s income consisted of two elements: the basic salary and a 
performance-based bonus. As some product categories were generally more profitable than others 
(e.g., currency options), front office staff, both traders and technologists, could have very different 
income levels. According to the front office technology manager, even though an individual’s income 
had never been the subject of open discussion, stereotypical stories and jokes, which directly or 
indirectly depicted individual’s income based on product category, spread quickly around the trading 
floor. For instance, he argued that his team regularly frequented London’s up-market restaurants, such 
as The Ivy and OXO Tower, while other teams “tended to hang out a lot in Chinatown”. He added that 
most members of his team had a SW post code (referring to up-market residential areas of London 
such as Kensington and Chelsea), while others could only afford to live in the suburbs or more down-
market locations. Conversely, some interviewees expressed their unpleasant experiences in dealing 
with their “up-market” colleagues. For instance, one front office technologist complained that it was 
very annoying when other technologists from different product categories bombarded him with 
continuous references to their new sports cars or designer label suits.
To sum up, sub-cultural differences were clearly evident in Invebank and were a source of inter-group 
tension and conflict. These tensions and conflicts were reflected in the low level of information 
sharing and collaboration not only between Business Units and between the technology and business 
divisions, but also between teams working for different product categories in the same division. Given 
these very distinctive sub-cultures, the development of CBD, which requires high levels of 
collaboration and trust, was hampered. These sub-cultural differences appeared to have their origin in 
both groups and individuals, notably different task requirements, different abilities to control 
resources, and differences in the length and nature of employment.  
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4. DISCUSSION 
Within Invebank, the implementation of CBD has not achieved all the expected benefits, at least not 
to-date. Management is aware of some of the problems, especially in relation to the lack of a 
collaborative culture, but has not managed to overcome them. In this discussion we focus on the 
characteristics of CBD, the relationship between CBD and organizational change, and the management 
of sub-cultural differences.
In terms of the characteristics of CBD, what Invebank has been implementing and continuously 
building is a component-based infrastructure, an inventory of reusable components and an innovation 
system, all of which are jointly expected to fundamentally transform the way in which software is 
engineered. Therefore, instead of considering CBD as a technology per se, it is more appropriate to 
view it is a philosophy, which Invebank aimed to embed into its technology development mindset, 
value and practice. Also, CBD characterizes a distinctive pattern of technology innovation, which 
demands an effective integration of centralized planning and decentralized development. In terms of 
the need for a centralized approach (Ward and Griffiths, 1996), CBD requires the establishment of a 
common infrastructure, the development of reusable components, and coordination between various 
functions and technology teams to support and fulfill business objectives. Together this will help to 
ensure the availability of resources vital for the ongoing development of CBD. At the same time, in 
terms of its decentralized attributes (Ciborra et al., 2000), CBD requires various technology teams 
working on each product category to continuously develop product specific applications, and to 
collaborate when a technological solution for a new cross-category product necessitates reusable 
components from different teams. Hence, the inventory of reusable components can be increased over 
time and the cost of development can be reduced.  
This means that CBD requires substantial organizational change (cf., Galliers, 2001). In particular, 
CBD requires a high degree of cross-team collaboration. A shared understanding of required 
components needs to be developed between teams who possess product-specific knowledge. In 
particular there is a need for collaboration between technologists and end-users, to ensure that the 
development of a specific solution can effectively align with the requirements of the business 
objectives. However, as seen, there is also a need for collaboration between end-users. Yet these end-
users themselves are far from being a homogeneous group. In Invebank, there were clear differences, 
for example, between end-users in the front and back offices, and also between users working on 
different product groups. In this paper, we have addressed these differences in terms of different sub-
cultures and have highlighted the need to anticipate, recognize and manage sub-cultural differences. 
As seen, there is some recognition of the importance of sub-cultural differences in the literature on 
technological development. In particular, many writers have pointed out that problems often occur 
because of the different mind-sets and orientations (i.e. different sub-cultures) between those working 
in IT and those in business functions (e.g., Feeny and Willcocks, 1999). However, in this paper, we 
have demonstrated that these sub-cultural differences are much more pervasive than simply a business-
IT divide. In addition, key differences exist between various business functions. The existence of these 
multiple business sub-cultures means that it is not helpful to talk about ‘end-users’ or ‘technologists’ 
as if they were both from homogenous groups. In particular, where a technology is developed by 
different teams of technologists, and used by end-users who are located in functions with very 
different sub-cultures, the problem is not simply an IT versus business issue, as is commonly 
described (Grindley, 1995). Rather, the problems occur within as well as between the technologists 
and business people themselves. Collaboration between the technologists and between the end-users 
can be just as problematic as between technologists and end-users.  
Drawing on the management literature, viewpoints related to the value and effect of sub-cultural 
differences are diverse and contradictory. On the one hand, sub-cultural differences are perceived as a 
key source of creativity in some innovation studies (e.g., Ford and Randolph, 1992). On the other 
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hand, communication efficiency can be significantly compromised by sub-cultural differences, simply 
because of the lack of common knowledge (Demsetz, 1991) and misperception resulting in 
paradigmatic diversity (Schein, 1996). Nevertheless, in relation to the adoption of integrating 
technologies such as CBD (but also including such technologies as BPR and ERP), a key message 
from the literature is that there is a need to overcome the more negative aspects of sub-cultural 
diversity. The key would appear to be to retain diversity while developing what might be described as 
sub-cultural collaboration. For example, Davenport (1994) discusses the importance of an open 
information culture, while Ruppel and Harrington (2001) and El Sawy et al. (2001) argue for a culture 
that encourages trust and knowledge sharing.
Drawing on this literature then, and simply applying it to the Invebank case, we might argue that the 
solution might have been to develop a collaborative organizational culture. However, we believe that 
this is naïve, since it over-simplifies the cultural concept in relation to the sub-cultural complexities of 
organizations like Invebank. We have attempted to demonstrate that there is no single organizational 
culture in Invebank, but rather multiple sub-cultures, each with their own values, norms and practices. 
These different sub-cultures exist because different groups have different tasks to fulfill; these 
different tasks place very different demands on the individuals involved and often require different 
orientations, approaches and outlooks (Blackler, 1995). To dismiss these different cultures as the mere 
vagaries of history, which can - and should - be relatively simply over-turned so that individuals come 
to share a consensus view, underestimates, misunderstands and misrepresents the different current 
realities and imperatives faced by different groups.  
In terms of solutions, much of the literature is not merely simplistic but is also often silent as to how to 
actually achieve the ‘open’ and ‘collaborative’ culture often called-for. Where this issue is addressed, 
the key is usually to create some knowledge redundancy (Nonaka, 1994) so that those in the different 
functions learn something about the work and activities of those involved in other functions or groups. 
This will then allow them to appreciate the needs of others so that information sharing can occur. For 
example, in relation to the literature on technology adoption, Earl and Skyrme (1992) argue that the 
solution to the problem of sub-cultural differences between technologists and business people is to 
create ‘hybrids’ – technologists with business knowledge and business people with technology 
knowledge. While this ‘solution’ clearly has some merit, the degree and complexity of sub-cultural 
differences in organizations like Invebank suggests that this solution would be rather expensive and 
certainly not easily achievable in the short-term. Indeed, the very feasibility of the ‘hybrid’ solution 
has been called into question in view of this (cf., Currie and Glover, 1999).  Perhaps a better approach, 
in the short-term at least, is to accept these sub-cultural differences as barriers to effective 
collaboration across teams and functions and to work round them by forming teams working on 
particular modules, designed to knit together to form a coherent whole. Emphasis would thus be 
placed on ensuring ‘boundary spanning’ activities and communication. Nothwithstanding, the purpose 
of this paper has not been to present generalizable solutions to this issue of contrasting sub-cultures, 
but to awaken interest into the complexities of the development and implementation of so-called 
corporate-wide integrative technologies such as CBD. To be forewarned is to be forearmed. 
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